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HONORING INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY:  
SWITCHING THE DEFAULT RULE1 FROM PRETRIAL DETENTION TO PRETRIAL RELEASE IN
TEXAS’S BAIL SYSTEM  
Stephen L. Rispoli* 
ABSTRACT 
Texas’s current prison population consists of far more pretrial detainees than convicted 
criminals. Despite United States and Texas constitutional protections, the default rule in many 
jurisdictions, including Texas, detains misdemeanor and non-violent felony defendants unless they 
can post a monetary bond or get a surety to post the bond for them (“bail bond”) to obtain their 
release. Most pretrial detainees remain detained due not to their alleged dangerousness, but rather 
because they simply cannot afford to post bail (or get someone to post it for them). As a result, 
many pretrial detainees find themselves choosing between hamstringing their financial future or 
remaining in detention until trial. If Americans are serious about “honoring the presumption of 
innocence,” we must reform the way that misdemeanor and non-violent felony defendants are 
treated while awaiting trial. Rather than treat them as guilty and keep them in jail unless they can 
pay for their release, the standard should be to release them unless there is a very good reason for 
not doing so.  
By changing the default option from pretrial detention to pretrial release, many Texas 
judges will be more pre-disposed to release misdemeanor and non-violent felony defendants on 
conditions other than the posting of monetary bail. This switch will result in fewer people being 
detained simply because they cannot afford to be released—which will prevent adverse economic 
consequences to already disadvantaged citizens. 
Proposed reform has been discussed for decades. Reforming the bail system in Texas is a 
current, critical need. This criminal justice issue undermines the public’s faith in our system of 
justice and detrimentally affects the economic and social status of countless citizens who will 
ultimately be found not guilty. Doing nothing weakens our overall rule-of-law system and 
ultimately erodes the foundation upon which our society is built. 
* Stephen L. Rispoli, Baylor Law J.D. ‘12, Texas Law LL.M. ‘18, is the Assistant Dean of Student Affairs and
Pro Bono Programs at Baylor Law School. He is indebted to Dean Brad Toben, Dean Leah Teague, Professor 
Lauren Fielder, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Presiding Judge Sharon Keller, and David Slayton, for their 
support, helpful comments, and feedback. 
1 This phrase, “switching the default rule,” is borrowed from Professor Cass Sunstein’s article, Switching the 
Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106 (2002). Professor Sunstein’s influential law review article captures the essence 
of how one simple shift in thinking can dramatically affect outcomes. Such a shift in bail reform could result in a 
tremendous benefit to society. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V6.Arg.4
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FOREWORD, BY JUDGE SHARON KELLER, PRESIDING JUDGE, TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 
 
Bail reform is a topic of much discussion these days, and rightly so. Many studies have 
been done and many articles have been written that detail the unhappy consequences—to those 
accused of a crime and to taxpayers alike—of the current system in Texas. In this Article, Dean 
Rispoli brings to the issue new arguments based on fields such as history and, intriguingly, 
psychology.  
 
The purpose of bail, as he says, is to ensure the presence of the accused at trial. But over 
the years, we seem to have lost sight of that original goal. As a result, there are times when a person 
who cannot afford bail faces the prospect of losing a job and being unable to take care of one’s 
family. Studies have shown that people who are not released promptly from jail prior to trial are 
more likely to plead guilty and more likely to re-offend. Additionally, the outcomes of cases where 
the accused is not released on bail are less favorable that the outcomes of those who are promptly 
released. All of this seems contrary to our ideas about the presumption of innocence, and that is 
one reason that the matter of bail reform has become the topic of conversation that it has.  
 
Another reason is the cost to the taxpayers. Studies show that when people realize how 
much it costs to keep an accused person in jail, they are likely to conclude that bail reform is an 
idea worth pursuing. The confluence of humanitarian concerns and cost issues makes this a 
propitious time for rethinking pre-trial release.  
 
Dean Rispoli has a new angle on bail that derives from the psychology of choice. As it 
turns out, there are ways to encourage certain choices while nevertheless leaving judges free to do 
what they do: make judgements about pre-trial release. The details of these studies and the 
conclusions to which they lead are a fascinating part of Dean Rispoli’s article. His take on this 























I. INTRODUCTION  
 
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.” 
- 8th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
 
“Honoring the presumption of innocence is often difficult; sometimes we must pay 
substantial social costs as a result of our commitment to the values we espouse. But 
at the end of the day the presumption of innocence protects the innocent; the 
shortcuts we take with those whom we believe to be guilty injure only those 
wrongfully accused and, ultimately, ourselves. 
 
Throughout the world today there are men, women, and children interned 
indefinitely, awaiting trials which may never come or which may be a mockery of 
the word, because their governments believe them to be ‘dangerous.’ Our 
Constitution, whose construction began two centuries ago, can shelter us forever 
from the evils of such unchecked power. Over 200 years it has slowly, through our 
efforts, grown more durable, more expansive, and more just. But it cannot 
protect us if we lack the courage, and the self-restraint, to protect ourselves.” 
- Justice Thurgood Marshall2 
 
The detention bail system has become a common fixture in American life.3 Yet while 
discussions around the bail system emphasize the need for reform, possible remedies for those 
currently suffering at the hands of the system’s deficiencies have fallen through the cracks.4 
Texas’s current prison population consists of far more pretrial detainees than convicted criminals.5 
The default rule in many jurisdictions, including Texas, detains misdemeanor and non-violent 
felony defendants unless they can post a monetary bond or get a surety to post the bond for them 
(“bail bond”) to obtain their release.6 Most pretrial detainees remain detained not due to their 
alleged dangerousness, but rather because they simply cannot afford to post bail (or get someone 
to post it for them).7 As a result, many pretrial detainees find themselves choosing between 
hamstringing their financial future or remaining in detention until trial. Of course, choosing to 
                                                 
2 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 767 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
3 LastWeekTonight, Bail: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE (June 7, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IS5mwymTIJU [https://perma.cc/JK6K-LLAC]. 
4 See Kamala D. Harris & Rand Paul, Kamala Harris and Rand Paul: To Shrink Jails, Let’s Reform Bail, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/opinion/kamala-harris-and-rand-paul-lets-reform-
bail.html [https://perma.cc/XYC9-G63K]. 
5 Nathan L. Hecht, Chief Justice, The Supreme Court of Tex., Address to the 85th Texas Legislature (Feb. 1, 
2017). 
6 Default rules tend to be “sticky,” meaning that most people will stick to the default rule simply because it is 
the default rule. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 109; see also Eli Rosenberg, Judge in Houston Strikes Down Harris 
County’s Bail System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/29/us/judge-strikes-down-
harris-county-bail-system.html?mcubz=0&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5GLR-DQFV].  (last visited May 14, 2018). 
7 Harris & Paul, supra note 4. 





remain in detention until trial also has significant financial ramifications, such as losing 
employment, and significant personal ramifications, such as children being left at home alone.  
 
Reforming the bail system in Texas is a current, critical need. This criminal justice issue 
undermines the public’s faith in our system of justice and detrimentally affects the economic and 
social status of countless citizens who will ultimately be found not guilty. To do nothing weakens 
our overall rule-of-law system and ultimately erodes the foundation upon which our society is 
built.  
 
In many other jurisdictions, the default of pretrial release for defendants has been in place 
for many years. Other jurisdictions have switched the default rule for misdemeanor and non-
violent felony defendants from pretrial detention to pretrial release (with non-monetary 
conditions). By changing the default option, many Texas judges will be more predisposed to 
release misdemeanor and non-violent felony defendants on conditions other than the posting of 
monetary bail. This switch will result in fewer people being detained simply because they cannot 
afford to be released—which will prevent adverse economic consequences to already 
disadvantaged citizens. The positive impact on our economy, current criminal justice system, and 
the rule of law will be monumental. 
 
II. THE INSTITUTION OF BAIL—IN TEXAS AND BEYOND 
 
“Twenty years ago, not quite one-third of [Texas’s] jail population was awaiting 
trial. Now the number is three-fourths. Liberty is precious to Americans, and any 
deprivation must be scrutinized. To protect public safety and ensure that those 
accused of a crime will appear at trial, persons charged with breaking the law may 
be detained before their guilt or innocence can be adjudicated, but that detention 
must not extend beyond its justifications. Many who are arrested cannot afford a 
bail bond and remain in jail awaiting a hearing. Though presumed innocent, they 
lose their jobs and families, and are more likely to re-offend. And if all this weren't 
bad enough, taxpayers must shoulder the cost—a staggering $1 billion per year.” 
- Hon. Nathan L. Hecht, Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice8 
 
A. The History of Bail 
 
Bail, which invokes the question of whether to release a person accused of a crime between 
arrest and trial, is an ancient concept—dating back at least to the time of Plato.9 This question of 
release, and more importantly, how to secure a defendant’s presence in court, has likely been hotly 
debated ever since the institution began.10 Bail is meant to complement the common law 
presumption of innocence by allowing a person charged of a crime to remain free until trial as long 
                                                 
8 Hecht, supra note 5. 
9 Harold Don Teague, The Administration of Bail and Pretrial Freedom in Texas, 43 Tex. L. Rev. 356, 356 n.1 
(1965). 
10 See id. at 356. 
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as there is some assurance that the defendant will not skip out of the trial.11 This assurance has 
traditionally been secured through the personal promise of the defendant or a representative of the 
defendant, or by forfeiture of a large sum of money if the defendant did not appear at the trial.12 In 
medieval England, a defendant did not pay sureties in order to be released.13 Instead, if the 
defendant did not appear at trial, the sureties were then seized and a fine was imposed on them.14 
 
In the United States, the common practice has developed into requiring “sureties to deposit 
money or real property . . . as assurance that the bail amount would be paid if the accused failed to 
appear for trial.”15 Although this assurance was originally made by the accused or a friend, 
professional bail bondsmen are now the predominant source.16 Professional bondsmen typically 
place collateral with the court to cover their liability and are allowed to write bonds up to that 
amount (or sometimes, pay the bond in full to the court). If the defendant defaults, the bondsmen 
must pay the amount of the bond or the bondsmen’s collateral is taken. Bail bondsmen charge a 
“nonrefundable percentage usually around [ten] percent” to the defendant for this service.17 
Professional bail bondsmen seems to be a unique American concept, given that most other 
countries have banned commercial bail bond companies.18 Yet only four American states—
Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon, and Washington—have abolished the practice.19 
 
The United States Constitution does not grant a right to bail. Instead, it states that 
“excessive bail shall not be required.”20 This provision provides little guidance; but, “prior to 
ratification of the Bill of Rights, Congress provided in the Judiciary Act of 1789 that ‘upon all 
arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may be death . . . 
.’”21 In Stack v. Boyle, the Supreme Court recognized that the concept of innocence until proven 
guilty requires the bail system.22 Further, the Court stated that the “sole purpose of bail is to ensure 
the presence of the accused at trial:”23 
 
Like the ancient practice of securing the oaths of responsible persons to stand as 
sureties for the accused, the modern practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit 
                                                 
11 Tex. Const. art. I, § 11 (comment).  
12 Teague, supra note 9, at 357. 
13 ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1069 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (citing 2 Frederick William Polluck & 
Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I 514 (2d ed. 1984) (1898)), 
aff'd as modified, 882 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2018). 
14 Id. 
15 Teague, supra note 9, at 357. 
16 Id. at 358. 
17 Jolie McCullough, How Harris County’s Federal Bail Lawsuit Spreads Beyond Houston, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 2, 
2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/10/02/how-harris-countys-bail-lawsuit-spreads-beyond-
houston/#bailreform [https://perma.cc/6Z3K-7CX8]. In most cases, the bondsman or bail bond company is never 
required to pay the bond amount. Should default occur, the bondsman or bail bond company must pay the full bond 
amount for which the defendant was released.  
18 Adam Liptak, Illegal Globally, Bail for Profit Remains in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/29/us/29bail.html [https://perma.cc/2YCP-XKJ8]. (last visited May 13, 2018). 
19 Id. 
20 U.S. Const. amend. VIII (emphasis added). 
21 Teague, supra note 9, at 357 (citing Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91). 
22 Teague, supra note 9, at 358–59 (citing Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951)). 
23 Teague, supra note 9, at 359. 





of a sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the 
presence of an accused. Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably 
calculated to fulfill this purpose is “excessive” under the Eighth Amendment . . . . 
Since the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant 
must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of 
that defendant.24 
 
This requires that the bail amount for each defendant must be determined on a case-by-case basis 
taking into account the different circumstances of each person and the nature of the charged crime, 
rather than a blanket bail system.25  
 
B. Development of the Texas Bail System 
 
Texas’s bail system has been a focus of discussion and proposed reform for over fifty 
years.26 The Texas Constitution, like the U.S. Constitution, also has a provision concerning bail: 
“[a]ll prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof 
is evident . . . .”27 The Texas Constitution further states that the judge has limited discretion to 
deny bail after examining the evidence.28 This language, from Article I, Section 11, is 
complemented by Article I, Section 13—which is similar to the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, but also includes what is commonly referred to as an “Open Courts” clause:29 
 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or 
unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open; and every person for an 
injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law.30 
 
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals—the highest criminal 
court in Texas—has also held that the purpose of bail is not just to secure release, but also to secure 
the accused’s presence at trial.31 In Texas, there are three options for a defendant to be released 
from jail while awaiting trial: (1) through personal bond, where sureties or other security may not 
be required, but the defendant must pay a “pre-determined amount of money if she does not appear 
                                                 
24 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). 
25 Teague, supra note 9, at 359 (citing Stack, 342 U.S. at 5). 
26 See Teague, supra note 9, at 356. 
27 Tex. Const. art. I, § 11. 
28 Id. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure mirrors the language in this provision. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 
Ann. art. 1.07 (West 1984). 
29 Many state constitutions contain “Open Courts,” “Access to Courts Clauses,” or “Remedy Clauses,” all of 
which are based on Chapter 40 of the Magna Carta. See Piselli v. 75th St. Med., 808 A.2d 508, 517 (2002). Magna 
Carta Chapter 40 provides: “Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus, rectum aut justiciam.” [“To no one 
will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.”]. WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 395 (2d ed. 1914). 
30 Tex. Const. art. I, § 13. The portion of this section that mirrors the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution is also provided in identical form in Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.09 (West 1984). 
31 Ex parte Reis, 33 S.W.2d 435, 437 (1930). 
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for future hearings;”32 (2) by “posting a refundable cash bond for the full amount of the bond;”33 
or (3) by “obtaining the services of a commercial surety who will post the bond for a nonrefundable 
fee.”34 
 
Also like the U.S. Supreme Court, Texas courts do not provide much guidance for 
determining what is a reasonable amount of bail. However, while the judge35 has discretion to set 
the amount of bail, that amount should not be so high as to be “used as an instrument of 
oppression.”36 Further, Article 17.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides some 
factors that can assist the judge in “determining the amount of a defendant’s bail:” 
 
(1) The bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the 
undertaking will be complied with. 
(2) The power to require bail is not to be used as an instrument of oppression. 
(3) The nature of the offense and the circumstances of its commission are to be 
considered. 
(4) The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken on this point. 
(5) The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense may be considered.37 
 
In addition, the following factors can be taken into consideration: 
 
(1) the possible punishment for the offense;  
(2) the accused’s work record;  
(3) the accused’s family [and community] ties;  
(4) the accused’s length of residency;  
(5) the accused’s prior criminal record, if any;  
(6) the accused’s conformity with the conditions of any previous bond;  
(7) the existence of outstanding bonds, if any; and  
(8) aggravating circumstances alleged to have been involved in the charged 
offense.38  
                                                 
32 Dayla S. Pepi & Donna D. Bloom, Take the Money or Run: The Risky Business of Acting as Both Your 
Client’s Lawyer and Bail Bondsman, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 933, 939 (2006) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 
17.01–.09 (West 2005)); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.03 (West 1984). 
33 Pepi & Bloom, supra note 32; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.02 (West 1984). 
34 Pepi & Bloom, supra note 32.  
35 For ease of reference, the term “judge,” as used in this Article, will refer to any official who has the authority 
to set bail within a jurisdiction. 
36 Nguyen v. State, 881 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.). 
37 Id. (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). 
38 TEX. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMMITTEE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5–6 (2016), 
http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1436204/criminal-justice-committee-pretrial-recommendations-final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GF9U-97NT] (citing Ex Parte Scott, 122 S.W.3d 866 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); Ex 
Parte Ragston, 422 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Ex Parte Castellanos, 420 S.W.3d 
878 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Brown v. State, 11 S.W.3d 501 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
Dist.] 2000, no pet.); Jobe v. State, 482 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2016, pet. ref’d); Cooley v. State, 232 
S.W.3d 228 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d); Ex Parte Hunt, 138 S.W.3d 503 (Tex. App.—Fort 
Worth 2004, pet. ref’d); Ex Parte Ruiz, 129 S.W.3d 751 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.); In re Hulin, 
31 S.W.3d 754 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.); Nguyen, 881 S.W.2d at 141; Ex Parte Goosby, 685 






Thus, it seems that Texas judges have broad discretion in setting the amount of bail and can take 
employment, and likely student status situations into account when determining bail. Yet problems 
persist in the Texas bail system.39 
 
C. Texas Issues 
 
There are countless individual stories about the impact of defendants’ failures to afford bail 
and the detrimental effects it has on Texas families—such as parents leaving children at home 
unattended for long periods of time,40 individuals losing their jobs,41 and the inability of people to 
afford a small $2,500 bond thereby being forced to spend weeks or months in jail waiting for trial.42 
But the number of people affected is staggering. Roughly twelve million Americans are arrested 
and booked into local jails every year.43 It is estimated that approximately “450,000 people are in 
pretrial detention in the United States”—both for those denied bail and for “those unable to pay 
the bail that has been set.”44 A majority of these people are held in jails at the municipal or county 
level.45 Nearly three out of five inmates in these jails nationwide are merely awaiting trial.46 In 
New York City alone, nearly 45,000 inmates are in jail because “they can’t pay their court-assigned 
bail,” even when it is $500 or less.47 Overall, the additional detention costs taxpayers 
approximately $14 billion yearly.48 
 
Texas, the second largest state in the nation, has an unusually large number of pretrial 
defendants in jail. An October 2016 report by the Texas Judicial Council estimates that 75% of the 
Texas jail population consists of defendants awaiting trial—all while they are presumed innocent.49 
This total is up from “just over [32%]” in 1994.50 
                                                 
S.W.2d 440 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no pet. h.); and Ex Parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1981)). 
39 McCullough, supra note 17. 
40 Cary Aspinwall, Overlooked: As Women Go to Jail in Record Numbers, Who’s Watching Out for Their Kids? 
No One, DALLAS NEWS (June 22, 2017), https://interactives.dallasnews.com/2017/overlooked/ 
[https://perma.cc/YVN4-VF2K]. 
41 McCullough, supra note 17. 
42 Cary Aspinwall, A Brief History of Texas Bail Reform, as 5th Circuit Looks at Jail Lawsuit, DALLAS NEWS 
(Oct. 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2017/10/04/brief-history-texas-bail-reform-5th-circuit-looks-
jail-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/L89V-X3AB]. 
43 Jason Tashea, Bail Industry Battles Reforms that Threaten its Livelihood, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 2018), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/bail_industry_battles_reforms/ [https://perma.cc/8RGP-XGRA]. 
44 Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-
bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc/B36K-6S8Z]. 
45 James A. Allen, “Making Bail”: Limiting the Use of Bail Schedules and Defining the Elusive Meaning of 
“Excessive” Bail, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 637, 640 (2017). 
46 Tashea, supra note 43. 
47 Pinto, supra note 44. 
48 Tashea, supra note 43. 
49 TEX. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 38, at 2. 
50 Id. 




Five percent of Texans who spend three days or less in jail are likely to lose their jobs, whereas 
14% of Texans who spend more than three days in jail are likely to lose their jobs.52 These Texans 
report difficult financial situations, “residential stability” issues, and are “less likely to be able to 
support dependent children.”53 Moreover, there is also a racial disparity as African-American 
defendants are more likely to receive “higher bail amounts than are white arrestees with similar 
charges and similar criminal histories.”54 
 
Worse still, these pretrial inmates are much more likely to plead guilty than they otherwise 
would have and are much more likely to re-offend than they otherwise might have.55 Low-risk 
defendants who spend more than two or three days in jail are “[40%] more likely to commit new 
crimes before trial than equivalent defendants held no more than [twenty-four] hours.”56 If held 
for more than eight days, “the likelihood of recidivism increases to [51%] more likely to commit 
another crime within two years.”57 Further, allowing monetary bond without risk assessment is 
more dangerous.58 Most crimes committed by people out of jail on monetary bond are felonies, 
and likely to be violent felonies.59 In addition, victim costs are higher.60 
 
These statistics show not only costs to defendants awaiting trial––they also pose significant 
burdens on taxpayers. In 2016, “[a]ccording to the Texas Commission on Jail Standards, the 
                                                 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 4. 
53 Id. 
54 TEX. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 38, at 4. 
55 Id. at 3. 
56 Id. at 3–4 (citing C.T. LOWENKAMP, M. VAN NOSTRAND, & A. HOLSINGER, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL 
DETENTION (2013)). 
57 Id. at 4 (internal quotations omitted). 
58 TEXAS A&M PUB. POL’Y RES. INST., LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: PRETRIAL PRACTICES IN TEXAS 27 (2017), 
http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1437499/170308_bond-study-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UG7-6M7S]. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 28. 





average cost per day to house an inmate in a Texas county jail is $60.12.”61 The 2016 estimate of 
41,243 inmates costs local governments nearly $2.5 million per day.62 Assuming the population 
remains steady, “the annual cost to local governments to house pretrial inmates is $905,028,085.”63 
Combined with the statistics regarding pleading guilty and recidivism, this can cause an unending 
spiral of time spent in jail. 
 
Many of these problems stem from the “fixed schedules”64 that many Texas counties use 
to assess bail amounts.65 While the court setting bail can consider the conditions noted above 
regarding employment, education, risk to public safety, etc., these conditions are permissive—the 
court does not have to take them into consideration.66 Further, most of the cases dealing with 
excessive bail only provide guidance on what judges cannot do because the judge has discretion 
when setting the amount.67 
 
Tarrant and Travis counties provide an interesting contrast of this issue. A traditional cash 
bail system is used in Tarrant County while Travis County uses a “data-based questionnaire to 
assess risk.”68 Travis County allows “many low-risk defendants out on a personal bond, which has 
no upfront fee” but does carry a financial penalty if defendants fail to show up for court.69 Tarrant 
County’s traditional system, on the other hand, is 12% more likely to release violent offenders 




As evidenced by the statistics noted above, the default rule in Texas seems to be pretrial 
detention rather than pretrial release, regardless of the factors that the judges may consider.71 Given 
these unfavorable results and disparate impacts across the state, and the significant burden to 
taxpayers to fund a malfunctioning system, reform is clearly needed. Even so, Robert Kennedy 
advanced some of the same arguments advocating for reform when he was attorney general, and 
the issue is still unresolved.72 So, how will legislatures and courts attempt to deal with this issue? 
 
 
                                                 
61 TEX. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 38, at 3. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 See generally RECOMMENDED BOND SCHEDULE, 
http://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3245982/DallasCountyBondSchedule.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/E9H7-79GD]. 
65 See Aspinwall, supra note 40. 
66 Id. 
67 See, e.g., Nguyen v. State, 881 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.). 
68 Kera Christopher Connelly, Texas Lawmakers, Judges Push for Major Bail Reform, HOUS. PUB. MEDIA (Mar. 




71 See Aspinwall, supra note 40 (discussing “fixed schedules”); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15 (West 
1984). 
72 Pinto, supra note 44. 
Volume 6 Honoring Innocent Until Proven Guilty  2019 
 
 52 
III. CHALLENGES TO THE BAIL SYSTEM 
 
A. Eighth Amendment Challenges to Bail Systems 
 
While the text of the Eighth Amendment seems promising, Supreme Court jurisprudence 
has not elaborated on or defined what “excessive bail” actually means.73 In Stack, the Court 
examined the bail amounts set for defendants charged as Communists.74 The Court first stated that 
“a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail.”75 Further, the Court noted 
that bail should not be “set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated” to ensure the 
defendant will appear at trial. As such, the Court found that the amounts of bail set for the 
defendants were excessive because they significantly exceeded the maximum fine for the 
offense.76 The bail amount for the Stack defendants was five times the maximum amount of the 
fine.77  
 
The concurring opinion by Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter, did provide some 
hope for the future.78 Justice Jackson stated that the use of blanket bail systems was a clear 
violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(c),79 which requires a findings that the 
defendant will flee or pose a danger to society.80 However, subsequent major Eighth Amendment 
decisions such as Carlson v. Landon81 and United States v. Salerno82 have not provided much 
guidance for today’s issue. Neither discussed “excessive bail” in a manner that elaborates on how 
the Eighth Amendment applies to low-risk defendants arrested for minor crimes. Nor have there 
been any other major Eighth Amendment cases dealing with “excessive bail.” As such, legislatures 
and courts struggling with these issues do not have much to rely upon when crafting solutions. 
 
B. Reforms Attempted and Bail Lobby Pushback 
 
In the 85th Texas legislative session, a bill was introduced that would have accomplished 
major reform in Texas’s bail system.83 Senate Bill 1338, authored by Senator John Whitmire, a 
Democrat from Houston and Chair of the Senate Criminal Justice Committee, would have changed 
                                                 
73 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 533–34, 545 (1952). Carlson v. 
Landon, however, decided only one year after Stack, muddied the issue of defendants’ ability to receive bail. 
Carlson, 342 U.S. at 539–40. The Court held that bail could be refused for aliens charged as Communists because of 
their potential danger to society. Id. at 541–46. Unfortunately, the issue of “excessive bail” was not addressed in 
Carlson.  
74 Stack, 342 U.S. at 3. 
75 Id. at 4. 
76 Id. at 5. 
77 See id. at 3, 5. 
78 Id. at 7–18 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
79 Id. at 9. 
80 FED. R. CRIM. P. 46. 
81 Carlson, 342 U.S. at 546; see supra note 73 for a discussion of Carlson. 
82 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 743 (1987). Salerno involved members of the Genovese crime family, 
who were on trial for organized crime. Id. at 744. The offenses are much different than the average crime than those 
for which many Americans are currently detained in municipal and county jails across the country.  
83 See Mike Ward, Bail Bondsmen: Reform Bill Will Drive Us Out of Business, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Apr. 4, 
2017), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/texas/article/Bail-bondsmen-Reform-bill-will-drive-
us-out-of-11050902.php [https://perma.cc/JF7T-3N2B].  





the process by which courts decide who is released and who is detained until trial.84 The bill drew 
heavily upon the findings of the Texas Judicial Council’s 2016 Report, noted above.85 Rather than 
allowing judges to follow the “fixed schedule,” judges would have to make one of three decisions 
within forty-eight hours of arrest “based on the risk of failure to appear in court or presence of 
danger to the public or victim:” 
 
1.   Release on a personal bond, with or without conditions; 
2.   Release on a surety or monetary bond, with or without conditions; or 
3.    Deny release until the trial court conducts a pretrial hearing during the next [ten] 
days.86 
 
In essence, the bill would have switched the default rule from the use of “fixed schedules” to 
making the judge pick one of three options. In addition, the bill would have empowered judges to 
use risk assessments to decide which defendants receive bail “based on [the] likelihood to come 
back to court or commit new crimes.”87 Further, it would allow judges to deny bail for “high-risk 
defendants charged with violent offenses before trial, no matter how much money they have.”88 
Finally, the bill would have encouraged judges to use “[l]east-restrictive release conditions” for 
low-risk defendants to “make sure they come back to court and that the community remains safe.”89  
 
 The bill had wide bipartisan support being co-authored by Senator Judith Zaffirini, a 
Democrat from Laredo,90 and sponsored by House Representative Andy Murr, a Republican from 
Kerrville.91 Chief Justice Hecht of the Texas Supreme Court and Judge Sharon Keller, Presiding 
Judge of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, both spoke in favor of the bill before the Senate 
Criminal Justice Committee hearing.92 The witness list at the Senate Committee hearing shows 
that many bail system and criminal justice reform groups, including the Texas Public Policy 
Foundation, and the Texas Young Republican Federation testified, or showed up to the hearing, in 
support of the bill.93 
 
                                                 






89 Whitmire, Bill Analysis, SENATE RES. CTR. (Apr. 20, 2017), 
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/85R/analysis/html/SB01338S.htm [https://perma.cc/C5JM-NVAC]. 
90 Whitmire & Zaffirini, Authors, TEX. LEGISLATURE ONLINE, 
https://capitol.texas.gov/billlookup/Authors.aspx?LegSess=85R&Bill=SB1338 (last visited Dec. 27, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/5BCD-AQQQ].  
91 Whitmire, Senate Bill 1338 Sponsors, TEX. LEGISLATURE ONLINE, 
https://capitol.texas.gov/billlookup/Sponsors.aspx?LegSess=85R&Bill=SB1338 (last visited Dec. 27, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/Q2XD-P5QN]. See also Ward, supra note 83 (highlighting the wide bipartisan nature of the bill). 
92 Connelly, supra note 68. 
93 Witness List (Apr. 4, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/85R/witlistbill/html/SB01338S.htm 
[https://perma.cc/TGR2-57K6]. 
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 As noted in the Senate Research Center’s analysis, the bill would not have done away with 
surety or monetary bonds as they are “one of the previously listed judge’s decisions.”94 However, 
the opponents of the bill, mostly bail bondsmen, felt that this measure would “have a negative 
impact on their earnings.”95 In a letter sent by the Professional Bondsmen of Texas to bond brokers 
across Texas, the bill was labeled an “existential threat,” that “[e]veryone will be negatively 
affected or put out of business” by the legislation.96 Opponents of the bill also claimed that it would 
“overwhelm” many justices of the peace who supervise bail hearings because many are not 
attorneys.97 Further, they claimed that $7 million in bail fees and “millions more in forfeiture fees” 
would no longer be collected by counties.98 
 
The bill noted, though, that those defendants who would benefit from this bill were not 
bonding out, and thus it would not have an impact on bail bondsmen’s business.99 As critics of the 
bail bond system point out, the current system has a disproportionate impact on poor and middle-
class defendants.100 Yet it seems that the bail bondsmen lobby won this battle—the bill did not 
pass the House of Representatives before the session ended, killing the bill until the next legislative 
session.101 
 
C. Litigation to the Rescue? 
 
The bail system in Harris County has been the focus of critics and potential reform for 
years.102 A recent case—ODonnell v. Harris County, Texas—has challenged Harris County’s 
system and was somewhat successful in enacting reform.103 Three people—who had been 
“detained because they were too poor to pay the amount needed for release” under Harris County’s 
system—brought the case.104 The bail amounts at issue in this case ranged from $2,500 to $5,000 
for the three plaintiffs.105 The issue before the court was the “constitutionality of a bail system that 
detains [40%] of all those arrested only on misdemeanor charges, many of whom are [otherwise 
                                                 
94 Whitmire, supra note 84. 
95 Id. 
96 Connelly, supra note 68. 
97 Ward, supra note 83. 
98 Id. 
99 Whitmire, supra note 84. 
100 Liptak, supra note 18. 
101Whitmire & Zaffirini, History, TEX. LEGISLATURE ONLINE 
https://capitol.texas.gov/billlookup/History.aspx?LegSess=85R&Bill=SB1338 (last visited Dec. 29, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/3WS9-2M26].  
102 See Marcia Johnson & Luckett Anthony Johnson, Bail: Reforming Policies to Address Overcrowded Jails, 
the Impact of Race on Detention, and Community Revival in Harris County, Texas, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 42, 45 
(2012). 
103 ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1069 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff'd as modified, 882 F.3d 528 (5th 
Cir. 2018). Of course, this litigation was not popular with the bail bond industry. The same letter sent by the 
Professional Bondsmen of Texas regarding Senate Bill 1338 also mentioned this litigation. Connelly, supra note 68. 
In addition to this case, U.S. District Judge David Godbey in Dallas has issued a similar ruling to the ODonnell case, 
except that it also applies to felony defendants. Daves v. Dallas Cty., No. 3:18-CV-0154-N, 2018 WL 4510136, at 
*1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2018). 
104 ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1058. 
105 Id. at 1062–63. 





eligible for pretrial release but are] indigent and cannot pay the amount needed for release on 
secured money bail.”106  
 
The court found that Harris County’s bail system violated the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses, and issued an injunction releasing all those who have been detained for 
misdemeanor offenses and were unable to afford bail.107 The district court found that: 
 
Due process requires: (1) notice that the financial and other resource information 
Pretrial Services officers collect is for the purpose of determining a misdemeanor 
arrestee’s eligibility for release or detention; (2) a hearing at which the arrestee has 
an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence; (3) an impartial decisionmaker; 
(4) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on to find that a 
secured financial condition is the only reasonable way to assure the arrestee’s 
appearance at hearings and law-abiding behavior before trial; and (5) timely 
proceedings within [twenty-four] hours of arrest.108  
 
The Fifth Circuit, however, held that the trial court’s holding was too restrictive.109 The 
Fifth Circuit’s modification in its opinion does not require that judges issue “a written statement 
of their reasons” for setting a specific bail amount and did away with the twenty-four-hour 
requirement because it was deemed too strict.110 Overall, the Fifth Circuit largely affirmed the 
opinion of the district court, and Harris County’s bail system is better for it. However, this does 
not switch the default rule of a monetary bond being required for most defendants to obtain release 




As legislators and courts examine this issue and attempt to effect reform, they will need 
guidance. Luckily, they will not be without any examples of systems where bail seems to be 
working from which to draw methods and procedures. This Article will next examine why fixing 
the bail system is important to the rule of law (and how to measure effectiveness); the importance 
of switching the default rule; and then turning to other jurisdictions where bail systems are different 




                                                 
106 Id. at 1057–58. The court also noted that Harris County Jail is the third largest in the country and over 
50,000 people are arrested each year in Harris County for misdemeanors. Id. at 1058. These “misdemeanor arrestees 
awaiting trial make up about [5.5%] of the Harris County Jail population on any given day.” Id. 
107 Id. at 1161. It is not inconsistent that this case is decided upon due process and equal protection rather than 
the Eighth Amendment because the Fifth Circuit has already held that “[t]he incarceration of those who cannot [pay 
money bail], without meaningful consideration of other possible alternatives, infringes on both due process and 
equal protection requirements.” ODonnell, 882 F.3d 528, 539 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 
1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc)). 
108 ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1153. 
109 ODonnell, 882 F.3d at 542. 
110 Id. 
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IV. HOW DOES OUR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AFFECT THE RULE OF LAW? 
 
“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is 
the carefully limited exception.”  
- United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
 
The rule of law is, generally, the notion that everyone is equal under the law.111 Under this 
precept, all people, regardless of rank and status, are entitled to fair treatment within the system 
that governs society, and equitable rules and procedures.112 Another core feature of this concept 
places “limits on the exercise of power by [the] government.”113  
 
The United Nations defines the rule of law as “a principle of governance in which all 
persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to 
laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which 
are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.”114 The World Justice Project 
(“WJP”) provides a more detailed definition of the rule of law:  
 
[A] rules-based system in which the following four universal principles are upheld: 
(1) the government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law; (2) 
the laws are clear, publicized, stable, and fair, and protect fundamental rights, 
including the security of persons and property; (3) the process by which the laws 
are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and efficient; and (4) 
access to justice is provided by competent, independent, and ethical adjudicators, 
attorneys or representatives, and judicial officers who are of sufficient number, 
have adequate resources, and reflect the [demographics] of the communities they 
serve.115  
 
These definitions include protections for every citizen, regardless of socio-economic status. 
Further, both state that all people are accountable under the law. Of critical importance regarding 
criminal justice, is that the laws are equally enforced and protect both people and property.  
 
The WJP uses a variety of basic concepts and factors to evaluate the rule of law, most of 
which relate to the functioning of the court system in a given country.116 The criminal justice 
                                                 




114 UNITED NATIONS SEC. COUNCIL, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies 4 (Aug. 23, 2004), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/2004%20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JTJ-S8FJ]. 
115 Botero & Ponce, supra note 111, at 5 (noting that this definition was “originally articulated by William H. 
Neukom in 2007, and it has since been vetted with thousands of individuals in over one hundred countries.”). 
116 See id. at 9–17. The first factor, “limited government powers,” “measures the extent to which those who 
govern are subject to law.” Id. at 9. The second factor, “absence of corruption,” contemplates the “use of public 
power for private gain.” Id. at 10. The third factor, “order and security,” “measures how well the society assures the 
security of persons and property.” Id. The fourth factor, “fundamental rights,” analyzes the “system of positive law” 
that protect human rights. Id. at 11. The fifth factor, “open government[,] allows for a broader level of access, 





system is a critical institution within a rule-of-law society.117 It is the system by which grievances 
are addressed and actions are brought “against individuals for offenses against society.”118 The 
WJP criminal justice factor evaluates the system based upon seven criteria. First, in determining 
whether the system is effective, it “[m]easures whether perpetrators of crimes are effectively 
apprehended and charged. It also measures whether police, investigators, and prosecutors have 
adequate resources, are free of corruption, and perform their duties competently.”119 Second, to 
determine whether the system is “timely and effective,” it “[m]easures whether perpetrators of 
crimes are effectively prosecuted and punished. It also measures whether criminal judges and other 
judicial officers are competent and produce speedy decisions.”120 Third, the project determines 
whether the “correctional system is effective in reducing criminal behavior” by “[m]easur[ing] 
whether correctional institutions are secure, respect prisoners’ rights, and are effective in 
preventing recidivism.”121 The fourth factor “[m]easures whether the police and criminal judges 
are impartial and whether they discriminate in practice based on socio-economic status, gender, 
ethnicity, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, or gender identity” to determine whether the 
system is impartial.122 The fifth factor examines the corruption of the system by “[m]easur[ing] 
whether the police, prosecutors, and judges are free of bribery and improper influence from 
criminal organizations.”123 The sixth factor studies whether the “system is free of improper 
government influence” by “[m]easur[ing] whether the criminal justice system is independent from 
government or political influence.”124 Finally, and most critical to the discussion in this Article, 
the seventh factor scrutinizes “due process of the law and rights of the accused” by measuring: 
 
[W]hether the basic rights of criminal suspects are respected, including the 
presumption of innocence and the freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
unreasonable pre-trial detention. It also measures whether criminal suspects 
are able to access and challenge evidence used against them, whether they 
are subject to abusive treatment, and whether they are provided with 
                                                 
participation, and collaboration between the government and its citizens, and plays a crucial role in the promotion of 
accountability.” Id. at 12. The sixth factor is “effective regulatory enforcement,” which “measures the fairness and 
effectiveness in enforcing government regulations.” Id. at 13. The seventh factor, “access to civil justice,” “measures 
whether ordinary people can resolve their grievances through formal institutions of justice in a peaceful and 
effective manner, as well as in accordance with generally accepted social norms rather than resorting to violence or 
self-help.” Id. at 13–14. The eighth factor measures whether the system has an “effective criminal justice system[] . . 
. capable of investigating and adjudicating criminal offenses effectively and impartially, while ensuring . . . the 
rights of suspects” and protecting victims. Id. at 14–15. The final factor, “informal justice,” refers to the ways that 
countries resolve disputes in “traditional, tribal, and religious courts as well as community-based systems.” Id. at 15. 
117 Id. at 14. 
118 Id. 
119 See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX 2017–2018 13 (2018), 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP_ROLI_2017-18_Online-Edition_0.pdf 





124 Id.  
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adequate legal assistance. In addition, it measures whether the basic rights 
of prisoners are respected once they have been convicted of a crime.125 
 
The American constitutional experiment with the rule of law “has appeared to be singularly 
innovative and successful and thus serves as a world model.”126 Specifically, the Bill of Rights has 
been consistently incorporated in rebuilding and developing countries seeking a rule-of-law 
system.127 The protections outlined in the Bill of Rights—such as the right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, right to remain silent, and the right to a fair trial—form some of the core 
criminal protections implemented in other countries.128  
 
 As such, it is surprising that the United States’ global rank on the WJP’s 2017 Rule of Law 
Index is nineteenth out of 113.129 This rank places the United States behind Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and many other Western European countries.130 Further, the United 
States is twentieth out of 113 for criminal justice.131 Again, the United States ranks behind most 
Western European countries.132 
 
 These rankings are based on questionnaires given to the public and to subject-matter 
experts in each country.133 Like many of the questions asked for the Rule of Law Index, the 
criminal justice questions were subjective.134 The questionnaire asked for opinions regarding: 
prison “conditions and overcrowding;” “rehabilitative programs and recidivism;” availability of 
“facilities for dangerous and less serious offenders;” prison escapes; “percentage [] of convicted 
criminals released from prison [who] relapse into criminal behavior;” police discrimination; judge 
impartiality; corruption of public officials; whether suspects were presumed innocent; likelihood 
of “torture and abusive treatment to suspects;” whether and when suspects receive legal counsel; 
whether the suspects are provided translators; whether defendants were allowed access to the 
evidence to be used against them; what rights prisoners have; and whether the government 
interferes in the operations of the criminal justice system.135 
 
Unfortunately, neither the surveys nor the Rule of Law Index analyzed the substantive laws 
or procedures of each country to determine which laws or procedures were most conducive to 
higher ratings. Nevertheless, the subjective responses of the participants are still helpful. When 
                                                 
125 Id. 
126 Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37, 48 (1993). 
127 Id. at 48–49.  
128 See, e.g., Stefano Maffei & David Sonenshein, The Cloak of the Law and Fruits Falling From the Poisonous 
Tree: A European Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule in the Gäfgen Case, 19 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 21, 23–25 
(2013); see also, e.g., Margaret K. Lewis, Controlling Abuse to Maintain Control: The Exclusionary Rule in China, 
43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 629, 636–48 (2011). 
129 WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 119, at 16. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 39. 
132 Id. 
133 WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, METHODOLOGY 152, 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/rolindex2016_methodology.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 
2018) [https://perma.cc/P7NA-8DN7]. 
134 Id.  
135 Botero & Ponce, supra note 111, at 53–54. See Appendix for the full list of questions. 





analyzing other countries’ legal systems, knowing what the country’s people think about their 
system is instructive. As courts implement the law, especially criminal law, one party will 
necessarily feel that the government, through the court, has sided against them.136 For many 
Americans, their interaction with the court and legal system will primarily be through compulsory 
procedures, such as the criminal law process. “Police, prosecution, and other agencies [of the 
government] executing criminal law may unjustly deprive a person of her freedoms.” 137 The 
“appointments, promotion, tenure, and salaries [of judges] depend on the government.”138 Those 
subject to the implications of a ruling may believe that the rich and powerful act against their 
interest in favor of other rich and powerful players.139 For example, a criminal defendant will likely 
view the prosecutor as part of the same rich and powerful group to which the judge also belongs, 
as they both operate effortlessly within the system.140 This observation is compounded if the judge 
rules in favor of the prosecutor.141 In fact, at the moment of the ruling, a “shift occurs from 
[appealing to a neutral arbiter for a decision] to a structure that is perceived by the loser as two 
against one.”142 If people perceive their criminal justice system is corrupt or unfair, it will 
undermine the entire rule-of-law structure.143  
 
This perception, in turn, affects other rule-of-law issues, such as access to justice.144 When 
the average American’s only interaction with the court system is a negative one, people are 
unlikely to turn to the courts for assistance when they need it in the future.145 Thus, bail reform 
and our criminal justice system needs to be as fair and balanced as possible. In determining what 
the best system of bail may be for Texas (and other states), it is helpful to examine the federal 
                                                 
136 See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 19 (1981). 
137 Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1506 
(2006). 
138 Id. “Arguably, only impartial jurors can adequately protect an individual from such abuses.” Id. (citing 
RANDOLF N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 18–24 (2003) (stating the conventional wisdom that perceives 
juries as protecting individuals from being abused by the government)); John B. Attanasio, Foreword: Juries Rule, 
54 SMU L. REV. 1681, 1681 (2001) (“The jury is one of the key protections of individual rights, shielding the 
individual against the government. Before government can fine, imprison, or kill a member of the community, that 
person has a right to a jury trial.”). 
139 See SHAPIRO, supra note 136. 
140 See id.  
141 See id. at 2, 19.  
142 Id. at 2. 
143 See id. “The inability to make bail has been a virtual constant in [Tyrone] Tomlin’s life. His first encounter 
with the law came when he was 14 or 15—he recalls being picked up on a robbery charge and sent to Spofford 
juvenile detention center in the Bronx because his family couldn’t pay bail. After a few months, he says, he pleaded 
guilty and received probation. ‘They said it’s supposed to teach you a lesson,’ he said. ‘It just got me worse.’ In two-
thirds of the times he has pleaded guilty to misdemeanors in the last 14 years, he did so either at arraignment to 
avoid being sent to Rikers [Island, New York’s notorious jail complex] or after already spending as much as two 
weeks at Rikers. Not once has he been able to pay bail. ‘I’m not Johnny Rich-Kid with a silver spoon,’ he says. For 
Tomlin, the historical evolutions of bail and pretrial jurisprudence are abstractions without meaning in his life. Bail 
is simply a feature of the landscape, the thing that means he is locked up when someone with more money wouldn’t 
be. ‘Sure, yeah, I’m mad about it,’ he said grudgingly. ‘But that’s the way it is. I’ve got to accept it. It’s not right, 
but it’s the way it is.’ He shrugged. ‘What are you going to do?’” Pinto, supra note 44. 
144 See SHAPIRO, supra note 136. 
145 See id. 
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government’s and other states’ bail systems, as well as the bail systems of foreign countries that 
rank more highly than the United States on the Rule of Law Index for guidance. 
 
V. HOW WOULD SWITCHING THE DEFAULT RULE AFFECT THE BAIL SYSTEM? 
 
The default rule, often referred to as the status-quo bias, is a person’s natural preference 
for the current state of affairs.146 This preference exists because people tend to see the 
disadvantages of leaving the status quo more than the advantages.147 This bias has been shown in 
a variety of studies and in the field.  
 
One experiment with the default rule involved proctors giving a hypothetical situation 
where the test subjects received a large inheritance from a great-uncle, and the proctors instructed 
the test subjects to decide how to invest it.148 The proctors gave the subjects different prompts. 
Some subjects received a neutral prompt, where the subject could choose to invest the money in a 
moderate-risk company, a high-risk company, treasury bills, or municipal bonds.149  Proctors gave 
other subjects a default rule prompt, where proctors also instructed the subjects that “significant 
portion of [the money was to be] invested in [a] moderate-risk [c]ompany . . . (The tax and broker 
commission consequences of any change [were assumed to be] insignificant.)”150 The proctors 
also gave the default rule prompt to other subjects with other alternatives pre-selected (high-risk 
company, treasury bills, etc.).151  
 
The results of the experiment showed that the option presented as the default was much 
more popular than the other options.152 In the experiment with two options for each question, the 
default was preferred over the other option in sixteen of twenty-four cases.153 With three options 
for each question, the default was preferred in thirteen of eighteen cases.154 The final version, with 
four options, resulted in the default being preferred in seventeen of twenty-four cases.155 This 
strong preference for the default option also seems to increase when there is more than one 
alternative available.156 
 
Both New Jersey and Pennsylvania’s state car insurance programs are an example of an 
“unplanned, natural experiment” of the “default rule” effect.157 New Jersey had created a program 
                                                 
146 See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss 
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148 William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. Risk & Uncertainty 7, 
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150 Id. at 12–13. 
151 Id. at 13.  
152 Id. at 14–19. 
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in which the default included a “relatively low premium and no right to sue.”158 Buyers were 
permitted to switch from the default and, for a higher premium, be allowed to sue.159 Pennsylvania, 
by contrast, created a program with “a full right to sue and a relatively high premium.”160 Buyers 
were permitted to switch from the default and, for a lower premium, be given no option to sue.161 
In both states, the default was kept by a majority of insurance buyers. “A strong majority accepted 
the default rule in both states, with only about [20%] of New Jersey drivers acquiring the full right 
to sue, and [75%] percent of Pennsylvania drivers retaining that right.”162 Thus, opting for the 
default is a strong tendency even when there are relatively low transactional costs in switching. 
 
This default-rule bias has also been proven in studies regarding changes to statutory laws 
or constitutional provisions that have been designated the default,163 patients choosing the default 
medical option to their detriment,164 and even that the default chocolate option tastes best.165  
 
The default-rule bias has proven to be “sticky,” and thus, resistant to change.166 “Making 
one option the [default rule] . . . seems to establish a reference point people move away from only 
reluctantly . . . .”167 Lawyers, and thus judges, also exhibit the default-rule bias.168 As noted above, 
using “fixed schedules” or otherwise requiring monetary surety bonds are the norm in Texas. Due 
to the default-rule effect, this means that the majority of accused persons awaiting trial will receive 
a monetary surety bond as a requirement of release simply because it is the default.  
 
But what if we were to switch the default rule? Instead of the norm being that monetary 
bail is required to be released, what if the default rule is that monetary bail is only required in 
                                                 
158 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 114 (citing Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance 
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exceptional circumstances? If judges have to make additional findings to set a monetary amount 
as a condition of release, what would that do to the number of defendants detained while awaiting 
trial? The research on the default rule discussed above suggests that it would result in fewer 
defendants sitting in jail simply because they cannot afford bail.  
 
VI. BAIL SYSTEM IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS169 
 
Other jurisdictions have experimented with switching the default rule in the bail system, 
even though they may not call it that when doing so. This Section will discuss jurisdictions that 
have moved away from requiring monetary bail as a condition of release for most pretrial 
defendants, and jurisdictions that have traditionally not required monetary bail. 
 
A. Federal System 
 
As noted above, the Eighth Amendment provides that “excessive bail shall not be 
required.”170 Additionally, though the Supreme Court may not have provided much guidance, the 
Federal Code of Criminal Procedure does provide more detail.171 If a person charged with an 
offense is not released upon personal recognizance or unsecured appearance bond, he or she can 
be released based upon the condition not to commit another crime during release and one or more 
of several other conditions.172 These conditions include maintaining employment or education, and 
                                                 
169Although only the Federal System, Washington, D.C., and New Jersey are discussed in this Article, New 
Mexico, New Orleans, Alabama, Georgia, and Maryland have also enacted bail reform. See ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 
251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1079-84 (S.D. Tex. 2017).  
170U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 
17118 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012). This statute provides: 
Upon the appearance before a judicial officer of a person charged with an offense, the judicial officer 
shall issue an order that, pending trial, the person be— 
(1) released on personal recognizance or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond, . . . ; 
(2) released on a condition or combination of conditions . . . ; 
(3) temporarily detained to permit revocation of conditional release, deportation, or exclusion . . . ; or 
(4) detained . . . . 
17218 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2012). This section provides: 
[S]ubject to the least restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions, that such judicial officer 
determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person 
and the community, which may include the condition that the person-- 
(i) remain in the custody of a designated person, who agrees to assume supervision and to report any 
violation of a release condition to the court, if the designated person is able reasonably to assure the judicial 
officer that the person will appear as required and will not pose a danger to the safety of any other person or 
the community; 
(ii) maintain employment, or, if unemployed, actively seek employment; 
(iii) maintain or commence an educational program; 
(iv) abide by specified restrictions on personal associations, place of abode, or travel; 
(v) avoid all contact with an alleged victim of the crime and with a potential witness who may testify 
concerning the offense; 
(vi) report on a regular basis to a designated law enforcement agency, pretrial services agency, or other 
agency; 
(vii) comply with a specified curfew; 
(viii) refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon; 





complying with several other conditions that assure the judge that the person is not a threat to 
society.173 Further, the judge “may not impose a financial condition that results in the detention of 
the person.”174 A district court may only set bail beyond a defendant’s ability to pay when the court 
explains the reason for doing so, for example, if the defendant poses a flight risk.175 As such, the 
default is pretrial release, not pretrial detention.176 The Federal rule seems to have been created to 
avoid as much disruption of personal life as possible until proven guilty of the crime.177 
 
B. Washington, D.C. 
 
In 1994, Washington, D.C. changed its bail system in reaction to current practices of the 
judges and prosecutors. D.C.’s code was amended to allow judges to set bail at an amount high 
enough to “reasonably assure the defendant’s presence at all court proceedings,” yet not high 
enough that it “result[s] in the preventative detention of the person.”178 The exceptions to this 
general rule are for defendants charged with a violent or dangerous crime, are a flight risk, or pose 
a danger to the community.179 
 
To explain this change, Judge Truman Morrison, Senior Judge on the Superior Court of the 
District of Columbia, testified in the ODonnell case.180 Judge Morrison stated that, prior to the 
1994 change, judges were using high bail amounts to detain high-risk defendants without stating 
the grounds for doing so.181 After the change, judges were more transparent about using 
“preventative detention,” as provided by the rule, to prevent high-risk defendants from being 
                                                 
(ix) refrain from excessive use of alcohol, or any use of a narcotic drug or other controlled substance, as 
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802), without a prescription by a licensed 
medical practitioner; 
(x) undergo available medical, psychological, or psychiatric treatment, including treatment for drug or 
alcohol dependency, and remain in a specified institution if required for that purpose; 
(xi) execute an agreement to forfeit upon failing to appear as required, property of a sufficient 
unencumbered value, including money, as is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the person as 
required, and shall provide the court with proof of ownership and the value of the property along with 
information regarding existing encumbrances as the judicial office may require; 
(xii) execute a bail bond with solvent sureties; who will execute an agreement to forfeit in such amount 
as is reasonably necessary to assure appearance of the person as required and shall provide the court with 
information regarding the value of the assets and liabilities of the surety if other than an approved surety and 
the nature and extent of encumbrances against the surety's property; such surety shall have a net worth which 
shall have sufficient unencumbered value to pay the amount of the bail bond; 
(xiii) return to custody for specified hours following release for employment, schooling, or other limited 
purposes; and 
(xiv) satisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the person as 
required and to assure the safety of any other person and the community. 
173 Id. 
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175 U.S. v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 110 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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released.182 Due to this change, most misdemeanor defendants are released upon nonfinancial 
conditions and supervision by D.C.’s pretrial-services agency.183 Currently, only about 1.5% of 
misdemeanor defendants are detained, even though secured money bail is still available in D.C.184 
Thus, D.C., by switching the default rule from pretrial detention through bond amount to pretrial 
release, has significantly decreased the number of people in jail for misdemeanor offenses. 
 
C. New Jersey 
 
In 2017, New Jersey bail reform took effect and nearly eliminated cash bail for criminal 
defendants charged with non-violent offenses.185 Like Texas’s attempted Senate Bill 1338 in the 
85th Legislative Session, this reform was aimed at preventing “violent repeat offenders” from 
buying “their way out of jail” and allowing low-risk defendants charged with nonviolent offenses 
out of jail if they could not afford bail.186 New Jersey now uses a risk-assessment algorithm to 
determine who should receive bail and how the amount should be set.187 This has resulted in a 16% 
decrease in the county jail population, and “preliminary [research] show[s] a [5%] decrease in 
violent crime” overall for the year.188 Thus, New Jersey has switched the default rule from a fixed 
amount to a risk-assessment algorithm, which appears to be successful in releasing more pretrial 
defendants.  
 
D. Foreign Countries’ Bail Systems 
 
Most Western European countries do not have bail systems, or they do have a bail system 
but use it infrequently. Regardless of system, these countries all lean toward pretrial release for 
minor offenses, unless the defendant is a flight risk or dangerous to the community.  
 
1. Countries with a Bail System189 
 
Like the United States, Switzerland has an “innocent until proven guilty” clause in its 
constitution.190 As such, Switzerland’s constitution provides that “any person in pre-trial detention 
has the right to be brought before a court without delay,” and that the judge must decide whether 
the “person must remain in detention or be released.”191 The criminal justice system allows for 
release of pretrial defendants through “personal recognizance or bail unless the [judge] believe[s] 
the person [is] dangerous or a flight risk.”192 However, approximately 27% of all prisoners in 
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186 Id. Also like Texas, this reform faced staunch opposition from the professional bail bondsmen lobby. See id. 
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192 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, Switzerland 2016 Human Rights Report, U.S. DEP’T 
OF ST. 5 (2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265692.pdf [https://perma.cc/K73E-PDNH]. 





Switzerland were pretrial detainees.193 More concerning, Switzerland’s highest court has ruled that 
“detention must not exceed the length of the expected sentence for the crime for which a suspect 
is charged.”194 Thus, unsurprisingly, lengthy detention terms have been reported.195 Even so, 
Switzerland’s percentage of inmates awaiting trial is much lower than Texas’s. 
 
The United Kingdom (“U.K.”) does have a bail system, and “defendants awaiting trial have 
the right to bail.”196 Like other countries, the U.K. does not release those “judged to be flight risks, 
likely to commit another offense, suspected terrorists, or in other limited circumstances.”197 
However, pretrial detention may not exceed 182 days unless it is an exceptional case.198 
 
Germany also has a bail system, but judges use it infrequently.199 Judges typically only 
require bail when there is a “clear risk” that the defendant might flee. Although, in such cases, the 
defendants are usually not released until trial.200 
 
2. Countries without a Bail System201 
 
Sweden, by contrast, has no bail system.202 Although some have criticized Sweden for 
excessive pretrial detention (likely for high-risk defendants),203 Swedish judges frequently release 
pretrial defendants.204 Courts will release people charged with offenses punishable with one year 
or more of imprisonment unless the person is a flight risk, is dangerous to the community, or will 
“interfere with ongoing investigations.”205 On the other hand, Swedish courts are unlikely to 
release people charged with offenses punishable with at least two years in prison unless “clearly 
unjustified.”206 However, each person’s detention is “reviewed every other week, and [defendants] 
can appeal against each decision to extend [their] detention.”207 
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Norway also does not have a bail system.208 Once police have arrested a person, the judge 
decides if the defendant should be released or held until trial.209 Those accused of minor crimes 
are frequently released, while those “accused of serious or violent crimes usually remain[] in 




As noted by Judge Rosenthal in ODonnell “[w]hether by legislative enactment, judicial 
rulemaking, or court order, there is a clear and growing movement against using secured money 
bail to achieve a misdemeanor arrestee’s continued detention.”211 This shift has taken place not 
just in other states around the United States, but is also the standard in most Western European 
countries that score higher on the WJP’s Rule of Law Index than the United States.212  
 
VII. SWITCHING THE DEFAULT RULE – TEXAS SHOULD IMPLEMENT A NO MONETARY BOND 
RELEASE SYSTEM FOR MISDEMEANORS AND NON-VIOLENT FELONY OFFENSES WHERE 
THE DEFENDANT IS UNABLE TO AFFORD TO PAY BAIL, IS NOT A FLIGHT RISK, AND IS 
NOT DANGEROUS TO THE COMMUNITY 
 
“Take a recent case in point, from The Dallas Morning News. A middle-aged 
woman arrested for shoplifting $105 worth of clothing for her grandchildren sat in 
jail almost two months because bail was set at $150,000—far more than all her 
worldly goods. Was she a threat to society? No. A flight risk? No. Cost to 
taxpayers? $3,300. Benefit: we punished grandma. Was it worth it? No. And to add 
to the nonsense, Texas law limits judges’ power to detain high-risk defendants. 
High-risk defendants, a threat to society, are freed; low-risk defendants sit in jail, 
a burden on taxpayers. This makes no sense.” 
       - Hon. Nathan L. Hecht, Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice213 
 
Returning to Justice Marshall’s dissent in United States v. Salerno, if the United States is 
serious about “honoring the presumption of innocence,”214 we must reform the way that 
misdemeanor and non-violent felony defendants are treated while awaiting trial. Rather than treat 
them as guilty and keep them in jail unless they can pay for their release, we should grant their 
release unless there is a very good reason for not doing so. Even though doing so may occasionally 
allow the accused to “run[] from trouble and the jail-term the judge had in mind,”215 it is preferable 
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to keeping misdemeanor and non-violent felony defendants in prison simply because they cannot 
afford their release. Thus, courts and legislatures should make pretrial release without bail for 
misdemeanor and non-violent felony offenses the default, except when the defendant is a flight 
risk or dangerous to the community.216 By making this trend the default rule in Texas and other 
states, it will increase the average American’s perception of, and respect for, the rule of law in the 
United States.  
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